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The United States Air Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly 
known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, was first established in 
1994 by President William J. Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy.1 The policy 
assigned the responsibility for expendable launch vehicles to the Department of Defense (DoD), 
with the goals of lowering launch costs and ensuring national security access to space. As such, 
the United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)1 started the EELV 
program to acquire more affordable and reliable launch capability for valuable U.S. military 
satellites, such as national reconnaissance satellites that cost billions per satellite.2 In March 
2019, the program name was changed from EELV to NSSL, which reflected several important 
features: 1.) The emphasis on “assured access to space,” 2.) transition from the Russian-made 
RD-180 rocket engine used on the Atlas V to a US-sourced engine (now scheduled to be 
complete by 2022), 3.) adaptation to manifest changes (such as enabling satellite swaps and 
return of manifest to normal operations both within 12 months of a need or an anomaly), and 4.) 
potential use of reusable launch vehicles.3 
Currently, the performance requirements for the next generation of NSSL vehicles to be used 
until at least 2030 include three payload categories: Category A (fits within a 4m payload 
envelope), Category B (fits within a 5m payload envelope), and Category C (requires an 
extended 5m payload envelope). Performance requirements also specify particular orbits, 
consisting of LEO (lower Earth orbit), Polar orbit, MEO (medium Earth orbit), GTO 
(geostationary transfer orbit), Molniya orbit, and GEO (geostationary orbit). As of August 2019, 
Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance 
(ULA) have all submitted proposals. From these, the U.S. Air Force will be selecting two 
companies to fulfill approximately 34 launches over a period of five years,4 beginning in 2022.5   
Additionally, there are still unresolved issues over how the contract acquisition model will 
function. The Air Force is trying to diversify the launch portfolio for the NSSL by picking two 
launch providers from a pool of four launch vehicles, but the process has not been entirely 
streamlined, such as Blue Origin’s pre-award protest and SpaceX’s lawsuit.6 These gaps 
negatively impact how well the NSSL program can accomplish the goals outlined in National 
Presidential Directive Number 40, which emphasize the role of U.S. space access and 
transportation capabilities in maintaining U.S. security and capabilities in an increasingly 
competitive and global world.7 
This paper will therefore first examine the objectives for the NSSL as presented in the 2017 
National Security Strategy, Fiscal Year 2019, Fiscal Year 2020, and Fiscal Year 2021 National 
Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), and National Presidential Directive No. 40. The paper will 
then identify areas of potential weakness and gaps that exist in space launch programs as a whole 
 
1 The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the U.S. Space Force’s center of acquisition excellence for 
acquiring and developing military space systems. Its portfolio includes GPS, military satellite 
communications, defense meteorological satellites, space launch and range systems, satellite control 
networks, space based infrared systems and space situational awareness capabilities. See “Los Angeles Air 
Force Base,” Los Angeles Air Force Base.  
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and explore the security implications that impact the NSSL specifically.  Finally, the paper will 
examine how the trajectory of the NSSL program could be adjusted in order to facilitate a 
smooth transition into new launch vehicles, while maintaining mission success, minimizing 
national security vulnerabilities, and clarifying the defense acquisition process. 
 
NSSL Program Background 
i. History  
The United States Air Force (USAF) implemented the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) program in 1995 as a way to acquire launch services and ensure 
continued access to space for critical national security missions.8 Prior to 1995, there 
were concerns within the USAF and space launch community “over increasing cost and 
decreasing confidence in the continued reliability of national access to space.”9 As such, 
the purpose of the EELV was to provide affordable, reliable, and assured access to space, 
as well as provide critical space lift capability to “support DoD and intelligence 
community satellites, together known as National Security Space (NSS) missions.”10 
a. 1990s-2011 
In the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress directed 
the DoD to develop a Space Launch Modernization Plan (SLMP) to “establish 
and clearly define priorities, goals, and milestones regarding modernization of 
space launch capabilities for the Department of Defense or, if appropriate, for the 
Government as a whole.”11 Thus, the primary goal of the EELV program was to 
reduce costs by 25% and to ensure 98% launch vehicle design reliability and to 
standardize EELV system launch pads and the interface between satellites and 
their launch vehicles. These efforts were further sustained by the FY1995 NDAA, 
which provided a recommended “$30 million for a competitive reusable rocket 
technology program and $60 million for expendable launch vehicle development 
and acquisition.”12  
In the initial competition the USAF provided contracts to four launch providers, 
which comprised of Lockheed Martin, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Alliant 
Techsystems, to develop launch vehicles. Lockheed Martin and McDonnell 
Douglas were selected, but after Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas in 1997, 
Boeing took over the EELV launch vehicle development. Both launch providers 
were retained as the space launch market was deemed large enough to support 
two EELV providers, which also provided the DoD with “some confidence in its 
ability to maintain ‘assured access to space’.”13  
In the late 1990s, however, the U.S. suffered “six space launch failures in less 
than a year. These failures included the loss of three national security satellites in 
1998-1999, at a cost of over $3 billion. One, a critical national security 
communications satellite (MILSTAR – Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) was 
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lost on a failed Titan IV launch in 1999… The other two losses were an NRO 
reconnaissance satellite and a DSP (Defense Support Program) satellite.”14 In 
addition to the payloads themselves, there were cost, schedule, and operational 
losses incurred by the failed missions. Changes brought on by President William 
Clinton and President George W. Bush’s administrations led to increased 
oversight activities and fixed DoD launch costs, respectively, and the DoD 
“revised its EELV acquisition strategy because of the collapse of the commercial 
launch market and the ongoing erosion of the space industrial base.”15  
In December 2006, Boeing and Lockheed Martin consolidated their launch 
operations into a joint venture under the United Launch Alliance (ULA), which 
resulted in two launch vehicle families under one entity. 
b. 2011-Current  
In November 2011, the DoD adopted a new EELV acquisition strategy, following 
studies and internal evaluation of possible business model alternatives. The new 
acquisition strategy “advocated a steady launch vehicle production rate.”16  By 
doing so, the strategy sought to benefit the government by using block buys of 
launch vehicles to provide a predictable production schedule; this demand would 
then stabilize the space launch industrial base.  In December 2013, the DoD 
implemented the strategy and signed a contract modification with ULA, 
committing the DoD to buy 35 launch vehicle booster cores over five years and 
the associated launch infrastructure capability. However, some members of 
Congress and external analysts disputed whether the DoD was actually saving 
costs with the new contract. Additionally, there were issues with the FY2015 
budget request that raised questions over how many launches were actually open 
to competition.  
According to the Congressional Research Service, the acquisition strategy has 
been adjusted to a three-phase approach: 
i. Phase 1 (FY2013-FY2019): Sole-source block-buy awarded to ULA to 
procure up to 36 cores and to provide 7 years of NSS launch infrastructure 
capability.  
1. Phase 1A (FY2015-FY2019): Modification to Phase 1 that opened 
up competition for NSS launches to new launch providers, such as 
SpaceX; the Air Force could award up to 14 cores to a new entrant 
over 3 years if the new entrant became certified. Phase 1 and Phase 
1A awards were made to ULA and SpaceX.  
ii. Phase 2 (FY2018-FY2022): Full competition among all launch service 
providers. The operational requirements, budget, and potential for 
competition are currently being worked on. 
1. As of April 2020, the DoD is currently in the middle of Phase 2; 
the competitions are accomplished through either Launch Service 
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Agreements (LSA) or Launch Service Procurement (LSP) awards; 
according to the GAO:2   
a. LSA awards are a set of three Air Force RDT&E awards 
intended to facilitate the development of three domestic 
launch system prototypes. The DoD awarded LSAs to 
ULA, NGIS, and Blue Origin in October 2018.  
b. LSP is an ongoing procurement competition that is 
currently in Phase 2. The second phase is a 5-year 
procurement of approximately 34 launches starting in 2022. 
USAF plans to select two space launch providers in 2020 
from ULA, NGIS, SpaceX, and Blue Origin, for the 
Vulcan, OmegA, Falcon, and New Glenn, respectively. 
Currently, ULA and SpaceX are the only launch providers 
that are certified to launch NSSL payloads.  
iii. Phase 3 (FY2023-FY2030): Full competition with the award of any or all 
required launch services to any certified provider.  
In March 2019, the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act changed the 
program name from EELV to NSSL to reflect a “consideration of both reusable 
and expendable launch vehicle during future solicitations.”17 Additionally, the 
FY2020 NDAA created the United States Space Force3 under the USAF, who 
now has jurisdiction over the NSSL program launches. 
ii. Program Purpose and Current Launch Vehicles  
As outlined earlier, the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) is a program under the 
United States Space Force (USSF) that aims to ensure access to space for the United 
States Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. government payloads. As of July 
2019, the Air Force Space Command defines the NSSL program objectives to be 1.) 
procure affordable NSSL services, 2.) maintain assured access to space, and 3.) ensure 
mission success with viable domestic launch service providers. Additionally, the 
“program is driven to provide launch flexibility that meets warfighter needs while 
leveraging the robust U.S. commercial launch industry, which has grown significantly 
during the past five to seven years.”18 The program has launched over 70 national 
security space launches for the Air Force, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the 
U.S. Navy, and has not suffered a launch failure since 1999; ULA’s Delta IV and Atlas V 
launch vehicles (which are older than the NSSL program) have performed over 90 
consecutive successful missions, whereas SpaceX has performed five successful NSS 
 
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for 
Congress. It is often called the “congressional watchdog” as it examines how taxpayer dollars are sent and 
provides Congress and federal agencies with objective, reliable information to help the government save 
money and work more efficiently. See GAO, "About GAO," U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
3The enactment of FY20 NDAA re-designated the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) as the U.S. Space Force 
on Dec. 20, 2019, which granted Title 10 authorization to the USSF as a new armed service within the USAF.    
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launches. The program intends to continue its track record, while seeking also to lower 
launch costs and better incorporate private-sector innovations. 
The current lineup of launch vehicles for the NSSL include four vehicles – United 
Launch Alliance’s (ULA) Atlas V and Delta IV Heavy,4 and SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and 
Falcon Heavy. 
a. United Launch Alliance – Atlas V 
“The Atlas V consists of a common core booster powered by an RD-180 engine 
(liquid oxygen and kerosene), the high-energy Centaur upper stage powered by an 
RL10 engine (liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen) and either a 4-meter (400 
series) or a 5-meter-diameter (500 series) payload fairing. For additional power at 
liftoff, up to three solid rocket boosters (SRBs) can be added to the Atlas V 400 
series while the 500 series can support up to five SRBs.”19 
Lift Capability to LEO:5 18,850 kg or 41,570 lb20 
Lift Capability to GTO:6 8,900 kg or 19,620 lb21 
b. United Launch Alliance – Delta IV Heavy  
The Delta IV Heavy consists of three common booster cores, each powered by an 
RS-68A engine (liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen), and the Delta Cryogenic 
Second Stage powered by an RL10 engine (liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen).  
A 5.4-meter-diameter payload fairing completes the “stack.”22 One launch costs 
about $350 million, making it an extremely expensive option for commercial 
launches.23 The Delta IV Heavy will be launching five final National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) missions between 2020 and 2023.24 
Lift Capability to LEO: 28,370 kg or 62,540 lb25 
Lift Capability to GTO: 14,210 kg or 31,330 lb26 
c. SpaceX – Falcon 9 
According to the SpaceX Falcon User’s Guide, the Falcon 9 is a two-stage launch 
vehicle, with both stages powered by liquid oxygen (LOX) and rocket-grade 
kerosene (RP-1).27 The vehicle is designed, built and operated by SpaceX. Falcon 
9 can be flown with a fairing or with a SpaceX Dragon spacecraft, and the first-
stage booster can be recovered for repeated space missions. In the First Stage, the 
Falcon 9 “incorporates nine Merlin engines and aluminum-lithium alloy tanks 
containing liquid oxygen and rocket-grade kerosene (RP-1) propellant.”28 
Additionally, the “Falcon 9 is the only vehicle currently flying with engine out 
 
4 For more details about Atlas V and Delta IV payload information and different configurations, refer to the 
User Guides provided at www.ulalaunch.com; guide is subject to change and revision.  
5 ULA defines LEO (Low Earth Orbit-Reference) as 200 km circular at 28.7 deg or 90 deg.   
6 ULA defines GTO (Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit) as 35,786 km x 185 km at 27.0 deg.  
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capability; Falcon 9 can lose up to two of its Merlin engines on the first stage and 
still complete its mission.”29 
Payload to LEO:7 22,800 kg or 50,625 lb 
Payload to GTO: 8,300 kg or 18,300 lb 
d. SpaceX – Falcon Heavy  
The Falcon Heavy is a two-stage, heavy-lift launch vehicle powered by LOX and 
RP-1. It can transport more payload mass into LEO or GTO than any other launch 
vehicle currently in operation. Falcon Heavy is the most powerful launch vehicle 
in operation with more than 5.1 million pounds of thrust at liftoff.  Falcon Heavy 
builds on the proven, highly reliable design of the Falcon 9. Falcon Heavy’s first-
stage is comprised of three Falcon 9 first stages with enhancements provided to 
strengthen the cores.30 
Payload to LEO: 63,800 kg or 140,660 lb 
Payload to GTO: 26,700 kg or 58,860 lb 
iii. Progression of Next Generation Launch Vehicle Procurement 
Next generation launch vehicle procurement is largely impacted by both the continued 
need for affordable and secure launch vehicles, as well as the need to phase out reliance 
on the Russian RD-180 rocket engine that powers the Atlas V, and the retirement of the 
Atlas V itself.  As such, in October 201831 the USAF announced it was awarding three 
contracts totaling $2 billion to Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems 
(NGIS), and ULA to develop launch system prototypes.  
In March 2019, USAF’s Launch Services Procurement (LSP) Phase 2 competition for 
launch missions from 2022 to 2026 moved onto soliciting bids for two awards, to be split 
60/40 between two launch providers.32 This phase was supposed to build off the OTAs8 
and Launch Service Agreements awarded in 2018 to Blue Origin, NGIS, and ULA. 
However, in August 2019 there were reportedly four proposals submitted - by Blue 
Origin, NGIS, SpaceX, and ULA - from which two companies will be awarded “up to 34 
launches over a five-year period.”33 
a. Blue Origin – New Glenn  
 
7 SpaceX does not directly define LEO or GTO specifics on the website. See SpaceX, Falcon User's for more 
details.  
8 Other Transaction Authority (OTA) allows the use of Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs), which can come 
in a variety of different forms and is typically distinguished by whether its purpose is for a research or for a 
prototype project. OTAs are not standard procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements, so they 
are not generally subject to federal laws and regulations that apply to government procurement contracts 




According to Blue Origin, “New Glenn’s fully reusable first stage is designed for a 
minimum of 25 flights, making it competitive for a variety of launch markets… 
New Glenn is a reliable, cost-competitive system with high availability. The 7-
meter fairing has two times the payload volume of any existing launch vehicle, 
which means more room for satellites and the freedom to build in more capacity. 
New Glenn is also able to launch and land in 95% of weather conditions.”34 The 
New Glenn will be able to launch payloads of 13 metric tons to GTO and payloads 
of 45 metric tons to LEO. 
According to Blue Origin’s information on all their engines, the “BE-4 is the most 
powerful liquefied natural gas (LNG) fueled rocket engine ever developed. Using 
an oxygen-rich staged combustion cycle, BE-4 is capable of producing 2,400 kN 
(550,000 lbf) thrust with deep throttle capability.”35  The company chose LNG as 
their fuel source “because it is highly efficient, low cost, and widely available.  
Unlike kerosene, LNG can be used to self-pressurize its tank. Known as 
autogenous repressurization, this eliminates the need for costly and complex 
systems that draw on Earth’s scarce helium reserves. LNG also possesses clean 
combustion characteristics even at low throttle, simplifying engine reuse 
compared to kerosene fuels” (Blue Origin, 2019). Regarding engine use, “seven 
BE-4 engines will power New Glenn’s reusable booster, and two BE-4 engines 
will drive the first stage of ULA’s Vulcan launch vehicle. The BE-4 engine will 
not only be used on New Glenn, but also ULA’s Vulcan rocket.”36 
Unlike many launch companies at Cape Canaveral, Blue Origin has decided to 
build their own, clean-sheet launch pad for New Glenn.”37 The New Glenn will 
have comparable capability to ULA’s current Delta IV Heavy.  
The New Glenn will be launching its first flight in late 2021.38 
b. Northrop Grumman – OmegA  
The OmegA is designed to use strap-on GEM-63XLT (solid-propellant) boosters 
(from 0 to 6 as needed) as part of a modular launch solution that can fly payloads 
to the various orbits that are needed for national security flights (ranging from 
100km low Earth orbit to geostationary orbit at 35,786km, and everything in 
between, with polar inclinations and Molniya orbits included). The OmegA is 
designed to perform all national security missions, which can require a lift 
capability of up to 18,000 pounds for geostationary transfer orbit, or 37,000 
pounds for polar-orbiting satellites.”39 
“OmegA was designed around a solid rocket booster core derived from the Space 
Shuttle’s solid rocket motor. The design choice of using solids for the first two 
stages and a liquid stage for the third stage was driven by the capability of solids 
to quickly thrust through the atmosphere as well as by liquid stages’ capability to 
go from one high-velocity orbit to another.”40  
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“Another driver for this decision, according to NGC, was that since 1980 solid 
rocket systems have four times less risk of failure than liquid systems as per 
gathered statistics, and there have been no solid rocket motor failures for the last 
18 years, resulting in an overall 99.7 percent success rate in the last 40 years, a 
greater success rate than liquid-fueled engines. As per gathered statistics, there are 
also fewer launch delays for solid engines (2 percent of delays for Delta and 
Shuttle caused by solid rocket boosters, compared to 22-24 percent of delays 
caused by liquid-fueled engines).”41  
The first flight for OmegA will be in spring of 2021, when the OmegA rocket will 
be used to launch two Nationsats9 for Saturn Satellite Networks (SSN)10 into a 
GTO from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center.42 Additionally, Charlie Precourt, vice 
president, propulsion systems, of Northrop Grumman, states that “the first flight 
of OmegA is a key step in our certification process for the USAF NSSL 
program.”43 
c. United Launch Alliance – Vulcan Centaur  
Vulcan Centaur is expected to reduce launch costs in comparison to Atlas V and 
Delta IV when it debuts, but future developments are intended to reduce costs 
even further. This includes evolving Centaur into the Advanced Cryogenic 
Evolved Stage (ACES), which will allow the upper stage to operate on orbit for 
weeks at a time to support multi-launch, distributed lift missions.”44 
“ULA also plans to recover and reuse the BE-4 first stage engines via Sensible 
Modular Autonomous Return Technology, or SMART Reuse… While the first 
stage fuel tanks will not be recovered, recovering the engines will allow reuse of 
the most expensive component of the stage.”45 
As of November 2019, ULA’s Vulcan Centaur “consists of a single booster stage 
powered by a pair of BE-4 engines, the high-energy Centaur upper stage powered 
by two RL10 engines and a 5.4-meter-diameter payload fairing. For additional 
power at liftoff, up to six solid rocket boosters can be added to the Vulcan 
Centaur rocket.”46 
The Vulcan Centaur ranges from 0 solids to 6 solids, as well as the Vulcan 
Centaur Heavy. Performance values are as ranges:  
GEO (Geosynchronous Earth Orbit): 35,786 km circular at 0 deg 
GTO (Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit): 35,786 km x 185 km at 27.0 deg 
LEO-Reference (Low Earth Orbit-Reference): 200 km circular at 28.7 deg  
 
9 Nationsat is a small 4kW GEO communications satellite system that can provide requirements for video and 
data communications applications. See "Introducing Saturn," Saturn Satellite Networks. 
10 Saturn Satellite Networks (SSN) Inc. was established in 2017 by former executives of satellite operator ABS 
to develop small geostationary satellites with digital payloads. Saturn has also expressed an interest in 




LEO-ISS (Low Earth Orbit-International Space Station): 407 km circular at 51.6 
deg 
LEO-Polar (Low Earth Orbit-Polar): 200 km circular at 90 deg  
MEO (Medium Earth Orbit): 20,368 km circular at 55 deg 
TLI (Trans-lunar Interjection): C3: -2 km2/sec2   
The first flight for the Vulcan Centaur is scheduled for 2021.47 The Vulcan 
Centaur rocket will be used to launch Astrobotic’s Peregrine lunar lander to the 
moon and will launch from Space Launch Complex-41 at Cape Canaveral Air 
Force Station in Florida.48 ULA has stated that “the launch of this mission will 
serve as the first of two certification flights required for ULA’s USAF 
certification process.”11  
d. SpaceX – Falcon 9  
SpaceX is bidding its current Falcon 9, which has already been certified for NSSL 
missions.  
 
NSSL Policy Objectives 
To better understand the nature of the NSSL program, it is important to track how the program 
and its objectives have changed since its inception. Following how space policy changes along 
with U.S. foreign policy may help provide insight into how the NSSL should adapt in the 
upcoming years and what goals are the most critical to pursue. 
i. Presidential Decision Directive 4 – 1994  
The National Security Space Launch was originally established in 1994 by President 
William J. Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC)-4 on National Space Transportation Policy and called for 
changes to existing expendable launch vehicles (ELV). PDD/NSTC-4 delegated the 
modernization, evolution, and technological development of the ELVs to the Department 
of Defense (DoD) with the goals of “[reducing] costs while improving reliability, 
operability, responsiveness, and safety.”49 As outlined in the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy’s Statement on National Space Transportation Policy, the policy 
“commits the nation to a two-track strategy of: (1) maintaining and improving the current 
fleet of expendable launch vehicles as necessary to meet civil, commercial, and national 
security requirements; and (2) investing R&D resources in developing and demonstrating 
next generation reusable space transportation systems with the potential to greatly reduce 
 
11 Astrobotic Technology, Inc. is a space robotics company; their lunar lander, Peregrine, delivers payloads to 
the Moon for companies, governments, universities, non-profits, and individuals. The company is also 
developing advanced space robotics capabilities such as terrain relative navigation, mobile robotics for lunar 




the cost of access to space.” With this strategy in mind, the policy sought to accomplish 
four critical objectives: 
1.) Establishes new national policy for federal space transportation spending, 
consistent with current budget constraints and the opportunities presented by 
emerging technologies.  
2.) Establishes policy on federal agencies’ use of foreign launch systems and 
components. 
3.) Establishes policy on federal agencies’ use of excess U.S. ballistic missile 
assets for space launch, to prevent adverse impacts on the U.S. commercial space 
launch industry. 
4.) Provides for an expanded private sector role in the federal space transportation 
R&D decision making processes. 
In contrast to today’s stance on foreign technology, in the post-Cold War international 
climate, use of foreign technology, especially Russian rocket engines, was allowed as 
long as the U.S. avoided building a dependency on foreign assets. 
ii. National Security Presidential Directive 40 – 2004  
In 2004, President Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-40 superseded 
all of PDD/NSTC-4 (1994) and portions of PDD/NSTC-49 (1996), providing new 
nuances to proposed policy and program objectives. Overall, the goal of NSPD-40 “is to 
ensure the capability to access and use space in support of national and homeland 
security, civil, scientific, and economic interests.”50 
Regarding the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, “capabilities 
developed under the EELV program shall be the foundation for access to space for 
intermediate and larger payloads for national security, homeland security, and civil 
purposes to the maximum extent possible consistent with mission, performance, cost, and 
schedule requirements.”51 Private industry is included more explicitly as well, as “new 
U.S. commercial space transportation capabilities that demonstrate the ability to reliably 
launch intermediate or larger payloads will be allowed to compete on a level playing field 
for United States Government missions.”52 However, there is still much discussion 
currently on what constitutes a level playing field.   
As is consistent with past policy, NSPD-40 allows for “the use of foreign components or 
technologies, and the participation of foreign governments and entities in current and 
future U.S. space transportation systems is permitted consistent with U.S. law and 
regulations, as well as nonproliferation, national security, and foreign policy goals and 
commitments and U.S. obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Missile Technology Control Regime,”53 with 
more elaboration on specific policy goals and legal agreements or limitations as 
compared to PDD/NSTC-4.  
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Overall, there is an emphasis on assuring U.S. access to space and decreasing the costs of 
launches. For implementation, the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and 
Transportation, the Director of the CIA, and Administrator of NASA were to jointly 
formulate a national space transportation strategy covering requirements, plans, 
schedules, and resources within 180 days following the release of NSPD-40. Specifically, 
for the EELV, the strategy “shall address how the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
program will be managed through 2009.”54 
iii. National Space Policy – 2010  
The National Space Policy directive was issued on June 28th, 2010 by President Barack 
H. Obama to provide “comprehensive guidance for all government activities in space, 
including the commercial, civil, and national security space sectors.”55 Compared to prior 
space policies, the 2010 directive “leans farther forward in support of U.S. business 
interests.”56  
Of the goals outlined in the policy, there are two that are most relevant to the NSSL: 
a.) Energize competitive domestic industries to participate in global markets and 
advance the development of: satellite manufacturing; satellite-based services; 
space launch; terrestrial applications; and increased entrepreneurship.   
This clause covers space launches and thus includes the NSSL. Private industries 
have been tasked with fulfilling contracts and providing launch services, even in 
the earliest days of the EELV. However, given the growing shifts in different 
industry players today, there is question as to whether a monopoly or duopoly, 
such as ULA and SpaceX’s joint control over current NSSL contracts, will 
continue to be the preferred system. The global market also needs to be 
considered when it comes to selecting providers for the NSSL, especially to 
mitigate possible threats or supply chain weaknesses that come with increased 
globalization in manufacturing.  
b.) Increase assurance and resilience of mission-essential functions enabled by 
commercial, civil, scientific, and national security spacecraft and supporting 
infrastructure against disruption, degradation, and destruction, whether from 
environmental, mechanical, electronic, or hostile causes. 
Since the NSSL is responsible for the launch of critical and expensive national 
security payloads, it is even more important to ensure that the launch vehicles and 
processes are capable of successfully placing infrastructure into the necessary 
orbits to achieve mission success.   
Under Inter-sector Guidelines, there are several Foundational Activities and Capabilities 
that are relevant to the NSSL: 
a.) Enhance Capabilities for Assured Access to Space. United States access to 
space depends in the first instance on launch capabilities. United States 
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Government payloads shall be launched on vehicles manufactured in the United 
States unless exempted by the National Security Advisor and the Assistant to the 
President for Science and Technology and Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy… departments and agencies shall:  
Work jointly to acquire space launch services and hosted payload 
arrangements that are reliable, responsive to United States Government 
needs, and cost-effective;  
Enhance operational efficiency, increase capacity, and reduce launch costs 
by investing in the modernization of space launch infrastructure; and  
Develop launch systems and technologies necessary to assure and sustain 
future reliable and efficient access to space, in cooperation with U.S. 
industry, when sufficient U.S. commercial capabilities and services do not 
exist. 
b.) Improve Space System Development and Procurement. Departments and 
agencies shall:  
Improve timely acquisition and deployment of space systems through 
enhancements in estimating costs, technological risk and maturity, and 
industrial base capabilities;  
Reduce programmatic risk through improved management of requirements 
and by taking advantage of cost-effective opportunities to test high-risk 
components, payloads, and technologies in space or relevant 
environments;  
Embrace innovation to cultivate and sustain an entrepreneurial U.S. 
research and development environment; and  
Engage with industrial partners to improve processes and effectively 
manage the supply chains. 
These inter-sector guidelines provide some insight into the necessity for 
interagency coordination and private-public sector collaboration for securing 
launch capabilities and procurement. To strengthen interagency partnerships, the 
policy further states that “departments and agencies shall improve their 
partnerships through cooperation, collaboration, information sharing, and/or 
alignment of common pursuits. Departments and agencies shall make their 
capabilities and expertise available to each other to strengthen our ability to 
achieve national goals, identify desired outcomes, leverage U.S. capabilities, and 
development implementation and response strategies.”57 However, the policy does 
not offer specific direction for how that process may be accomplished.  
The 2018 National Defense Strategy offers a possible direction for approaching 
interagency partnerships in calling for DoD’s cooperation and collaboration with 
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other agencies, such as the Department of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, 
Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, and the Intelligence Community, etc. in 
order to “identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, 
technological, and informational vulnerabilities.”58 A similar framework of 
communication and collaboration could be taken between private partners and 
public sector agencies to increase inter-sector coordination. 
Specifically, regarding the policy’s National Security Space Guidelines, clauses that are 
relevant to the NSSL are a.) Ensure cost-effective survivability of space capabilities, 
including supporting information systems and networks, commensurate with their 
planned use, the consequences of lost or degraded capability, the threat, and the 
availability of other means to perform the mission; and b.) Develop and implement plans, 
procedures, techniques, and capabilities necessary to assure critical national security 
space-enabled missions. Options for mission assurance may include rapid restoration of 
space assets and leveraging allied, foreign, and/or commercial space and non-space 
capabilities to help perform the mission.59 
iv. National Security Space Strategy – 2011  
Released in 2011, the National Security Space Strategy sought to provide direction for 
the next decade on responses to the space strategic environment. The DoD and the 
Intelligence Community (IC) was to coordinate with other departments and agencies to 
implement the strategy by “using it inform planning, programming, acquisition, 
operations, and analysis.”60 Sections that are most directly relevant to the NSSL are as 
listed:  
Providing Improved U.S. Space Capabilities: 
“In cooperation with our industrial base partners, DoD and the IC will revalidate 
current measures and implement new measures, where practicable, to stabilize 
program acquisition more effectively and improve our space acquisition 
processes. We will reduce programmatic risk through improved management of 
requirements. We will use proven best practices of systems engineering, mission 
assurance, contracting, technology maturation, cost estimating and financial 
management to improve system acquisition, reduce the risk of mission failure, 
and increase successful launch and operation of our space systems.”61 
“Mission permitting, we will synchronize the planning, programming, and 
execution of major acquisition programs with other DoD and IC processes to 
improve inefficiencies and overall performance of our acquisition system and 
industrial base. DoD and the IC will evaluate the requirements and analysis of 
alternatives processes to ensure a range of affordable solutions is considered and 
to identify requirements for possible adjustment.”62 
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Streamlining the timelines and program scheduling of major acquisition programs 
across other DoD and IC activities could potentially help minimize some program 
inefficiencies with resource usage. 
“To support the range of national security space activities, we will develop 
current and future national security space professions – our ‘space cadre’ – who 
can acquire capabilities, operate systems, analyze information, and succeed in a 
congested, contested, and competitive environment. We will build a more diverse 
and balanced workforce among military, civilian, and contractor components.”63  
Having a capable and diverse workforce for the NSSL program would help 
provide more dedicated resources. Creating a more cohesive network could also 
help better manage program needs with more efficiency and responsiveness. 
Preventing and Deterring Aggression against Space Infrastructure that Supports U.S. 
National Security:  
“Given the degree to which the United States relies on space systems and 
supporting infrastructure for national security, we must use a multi-layered 
approach to prevent and deter aggression. We seek to enhance our national 
capability to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of 
counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space systems and 
supporting infrastructure that support U.S. national security.”64  
“We will seek to deny adversaries meaningful benefits of attack by improving 
cost-effective protection and strengthening the resilience of our architectures. 
Partnerships with other nations, commercial firms, and international 
organizations, as well as alternative U.S. Government approaches such as cross-
domain solutions, hosted payloads, responsive options, and other innovative 
solutions, can deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked. This will 
also enable our ability to operate in a degraded space environment.”65  
This section highlights a need for more flexibility with launch scheduling and 
adaptations to sudden changes or other changes. 
v. Russian Annexation of Crimea  
In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea,66 which raised concerns in Congress regarding 
the use of Russian rocket engines to launch critical U.S. national security payloads. In 
December 2014, Congress voted to approve a ban that barred the Pentagon from 
awarding future national security launch contracts to companies using Russian engines.67 
The ban impacted ULA, who had been launching all NSSL/EELV missions up until 
SpaceX was able to also secure national security launches. ULA and the Pentagon were 
able to weaken the bill enough so that ULA could continue using Russian engines already 
in inventory or previously ordered.  In June 2015, the Pentagon continues to push for 
relaxing the ban, since the Russian RD-180 rocket engines would still be needed for a 
few more years while alternatives were sourced.68  
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In response to the demand to phase out RD-180 rocket engines entirely, the Air Force had 
solicited bids in March 2019 for Phase 2 Launch Procurement. In August 2019, four 
proposals for new launch vehicle were submitted by ULA, NGIS, SpaceX, and Blue 
Origin.  USAF will be testing them within the next few years with the goal of picking two 
launch providers for launches starting in 2022. 
vi. National Security Strategy – 2017  
The National Security Strategy was published in December 2017 and focuses on four 
main pillars:  1.) Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of 
Life, 2.) Promote American Prosperity, 3.) Preserve Peace through Strength, and 4.) 
Advance American Influence.69 
Under Pillar II, sections that are most directly applicable to the NSSL are:  
Lead in Research, Technology, Invention and Innovation: 
a.) Understand worldwide science and technology (S&T) trends: To retain U.S. 
advantages over our competitors, U.S. Government agencies must improve their 
understanding of worldwide S&T trends and how they are likely to influence – or 
undermine – American strategies and programs.  
b.) Attract and retain inventors and innovators: The U.S. Government must 
improve our collaboration with industry and academia and our recruitment of 
technical talent. We will remove barriers to the full use of talent across Federal 
agencies and increase incentives for hiring and retaining Federal STEM 
employees.  
c.) Leverage private capital and expertise to build and innovate: The U.S. 
Government will use private sector technical expertise and R&D capabilities more 
effectively. Private industry owns many of the technologies that the government 
relies upon for critical national security missions. The Department of Defense and 
other agencies will establish strategic partnerships with U.S. companies to help 
align private sector R&D resources to priority national security applications.  
d.) Rapidly field inventions and innovations: The United States must regain the 
element of surprise and field new technologies at the pace of modern industry. 
Government agencies must shift from an archaic R&D process to an approach that 
rewards rapid fielding and risk taking. 
 Promote and Protect the U.S. National Security Innovation Base (NSIB):  
The NSIB “is the American network of knowledge, capabilities, and people – including 
academia, National Laboratories, and the private sector – that turns ideas into 
innovations, transforms discoveries into successful commercial products and companies, 
and protects and enhances the American way of life… Protecting the NSIB requires a 
domestic and international response beyond the scope of any individual company, 
industry, university, or government agency. The landscape of innovation does not divide 
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neatly into sectors. Technologies that are part of most weapon systems often originate in 
diverse businesses as well as in universities and colleges.”70 The NSSL is one such 
program that relies on innovation and technology to maintain reliable and affordable 
access to space and needs protections in order to maintain national security missions. 
a.) Protect intellectual property: The United States will reduce the illicit 
appropriation of U.S. public and private sector technology and technical 
knowledge by hostile foreign competitors. While maintaining an investor-friendly 
climate, this Administration will work with the Congress to strengthen the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to ensure it 
addresses current and future national security risks. The United States will 
prioritize counterintelligence and law enforcement activities to curtail intellectual 
property theft by all sources and will explore new legal and regulatory 
mechanisms to prevent and prosecute violations.  
b.) Protect data and underlying infrastructure: The United States will expand our 
focus beyond protecting networks to protecting the data on those networks, so it 
remains secure – both at rest and in transit.  
These priority actions would help provide direction on maintaining security on 
areas such as communication, information, and operations, at all stages of the 
NSSL program and national security launches. 
Under Pillar III, the Space section offers more targeted guidance for space programs; the 
strategy considers “unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital 
interest,”71 and is taking into consideration the increasing access that other actors have to 
space-based systems, whether domestically or internationally. 
a.) Advance space as a priority domain: America’s newly re-established National 
Space Council, chaired by the Vice President, will review America’s long-range 
space goals and develop a strategy that integrates all space sectors to support 
innovation and American leadership in space.  
b.) Promote space commerce: The United States will simplify and update 
regulations for commercial space activity to strengthen competitiveness. As the 
U.S. Government partners with U.S. commercial space capabilities to improve the 
resiliency of our space architecture, we will also consider extending national 
security protections to our private sector partners as needed.  
These priority actions outline possible extension of security measures to the 
private sector, which may be more critical currently due to increased information 
flow and transfer between multiple parties and across different platforms. 
vii. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 2019  
The FY19 NDAA (H.R.5515)72 was signed into law on August 13th, 2018:  
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Under Sec. 1603 (10 USC 2273) Rapid, Responsive, and Reliable Space Launch, the 
EELV was renamed as the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Program, effective 
March 1st, 2019. Under Sec. 4101 Procurement, Space Procurement, Air Force, the 
NSSL was authorized $1.7 billion for Evolved Expendable Launch Capability and 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (p. 132 Stat. 2345 Line 013-014). Under Sec. 4201 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, the NSSL was authorized $245 million (p. 
132 Stat. 2368 Line 130 Program Element 1206853F). 
viii. National Defense Authorization Act 2020  
The FY20 NDAA (S.1790)73 was signed into law on December 20th, 2019:   
The FY20 NDAA establishes the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of armed forces. 
The Space Force is “part of the Department of the Air Force, much as the U.S. Marine 
Corps is part of the Department of the Navy. The new branch will be stood up over the 
next 18 months.”74 According to the U.S. Space Force Fact Sheet, “USSF responsibilities 
include developing military space professionals, acquiring military space systems, 
maturing the military doctrine for space power, and organizing space forces to present to 
our Combatant Commands,”75 and includes jurisdiction over the NSSL program 
launches. 
Under Sec. 4101 Procurement, Space Procurement, Air Force, the NSSL was authorized 
$1.2 billion for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (S.1790-831, Line 015). Under 
Sec. 4201 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, the NSSL was authorized $432 
million (S.1790-856, Line 122 Program Element 1206853F). The total $1.7 billion will 
be used for four launches under the NSSL Program. 
ix. Proposed Budget Request for 2021  
On February 10th, 2020, President Donald J. Trump sent Congress the FY21 budget 
proposal, which requested $705.4 billion for the Department of Defense.76 Within the 
Space Domain, the budget proposal requests $18.0 billion, of which $15.4 billion will go 
to the U.S. Space Force. Through the U.S. Space Force, the NSSL will receive $1.6 
billion for three launches. Budget materials do not yet specify how that proposed $1.6 
billion will be portioned across procurement and RDT&E.   
 
NSSL Current Events 
As of March 13th, 2020, the Space and Missile Systems Center is on track for the scheduled 
launches, with 10 NSSL missions scheduled for this year. Col. Robert Bongiovi, director of the 
SMC’s Launch Enterprise, also mentioned that the U.S. Space Force “[expects] to award [the] 
Phase 2 launch contracts, heralding the next generation of launch vehicles, effectively ending our 
nation’s reliance on Russian propulsion systems.”77 Though multiple government agencies and 
departments have been locking down or restricting activity due to recent COVID-19 issues, the 
NSSL does not appear to have suffered any delays or modifications to the schedule.  
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Another interesting development is the Space and Missile Systems Center’s Launch Enterprise 
Mission Manifest Office’s (MMO) integration of a multi-manifest small satellite vehicle, TDO-
2, along with the March 26th AEHF-6 mission aboard ULA’s Atlas V. The TDO-2 is “carrying 
multiple U.S. Government payloads that will provide optical calibration capabilities, which will 
support space domain awareness” through optical calibration and satellite laser ranging.78 
According to SMC “the payload is integrated on the aft-end of the Centaur upper stage, where it 
will deploy the TDO-2 multi-manifest satellite vehicle approximately 31 minutes after launch. 
TDO-2 will deploy after the second main engine cut off (MECO 2) and prior to the anchor 
AEHF satellite, which is only the second time this event has occurred during a NSSL mission.”79 
Most critical is the MMO focus on “enabling the ‘swap-out’ capability of multi-manifest 
satellites late in integration process,” which can be as late as one month prior to launch, which is 
significantly more flexible compared to the historical integration timeline for traditional satellites 
of approximately 24 months.80 Other launch providers have been looking at similar multi-
manifest/rideshare launch capabilities, such as SpaceX’s Space Test Program-2 (STP2) 
demonstrations with the Falcon Heavy.81 The goal of such multi-manifest launches suggests 
further possible affordability and mission flexibility.  
On March 26th, 2020, ULA successfully launched the first NSSL mission for the USSF (Wall, 
2020).82 The Atlas V rocket was used to launch the final Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
satellite (AEHF-6), which completes the six-satellite AEHF-MILSTAR constellation; AEHF is 
“part of the protected communications network providing global, survivable, protected 
communications capabilities for national leaders and tactical warfighters operating across 
ground, sea and air platforms.”83 Atlas V rockets were also used to launch the first five AEHF 
satellites in August 2010, May 2012, September 2013, October 2018, and August 2019.84 
To summarize, the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Program is now operating under the 
U.S. Space Force (USSF) with the continued goals of providing affordable and reliable launch 
capabilities for critical national security space missions. The program will also be looking into 
reusable launch capabilities for next generation launch vehicles, as well as phasing out reliance 
on the Russian RD-180 engines. Policy trends also point towards the desire to foster better 
relationships between private industry and government, with the goals of capitalizing on the 
private industry’s flexibility and innovation. All these goals continue to function within the 
context of a competitive space strategic environment that demands constant growth and 
innovation to keep pace with global technological developments and potential threats.  
With these policy trends and goals in mind, the paper will now examine possible vulnerabilities 
and gaps that are present in the space industry as a whole and how those weaknesses might also 
be present in the NSSL program. 
 
Potential Gaps and Vulnerabilities in the NSSL Program 
i. Technological Limitations  
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Space launch vehicles are technologically complex and involve numerous components 
and parts that each play a critical role. Failure of any one of these parts can have 
consequences ranging from minor damage to catastrophic mission failure, and there have 
been multiple past incidents resulting from damaged equipment, faulty testing, and 
missed vulnerabilities.85 Though the NSSL does not encompass launches with a human 
crew, vehicles in the program still deliver expensive and critical national security 
payloads to orbit.  Therefore, it would be informative to examine vulnerabilities and gaps 
in other space launch programs and commercial space launches when considering issues 
that might face the NSSL. Technological weaknesses include malfunctions in the 
hardware or software, while limitations address issues of longevity and durability of 
launch vehicles, especially concerning reusability. 
a. Software and Hardware Vulnerabilities  
 
i. Case Study: Starliner Software Failure  
In December 2019, Boeing’s Starliner was launched on its “inaugural, uncrewed 
Orbital Flight Test mission to the International Space Station.”86 To get the 
Starliner to the ISS, ULA used the Atlas V rocket to launch the Starliner into the 
planned initial-orbit trajectory, where the Starliner was then supposed to finish 
placing itself into a stable and circular orbit. However, shortly after Atlas V 
successfully placed the Starliner, “a Mission Event Timer issue resulted in the 
Starliner burning a significantly larger amount of propellant than planned and 
forced Boeing and NASA to abort the planned rendezvous and docking with the 
International Space Station.”87 As a result of such an early major software issue, 
“instead of an eight-day mission that would have seen the return of biological 
science samples from the Station, Starliner will now come back to Earth after 
just 48 hours in orbit, without the performance of  some of its critical test flight 
objectives such as rendezvous, proximity operations, and automated docking to 
the International Space Station.”88  Though software testing was done prior to 
launch, the Boeing teams had only run phases of the Starliner mission 
individually, rather than doing a full integrated test run from beginning to end.89 
Additionally, there were configuration issues with software and hardware for 
the Starliner, as well as communication outages that impacted the ground teams’ 
ability to directly command and control the Starliner after the mission timing 
error happened. The Starliner was recovered successfully after it landed in New 
Mexico and “post-landing inspections show it can be flown again.” Some of the 
system functions were successfully demonstrated.90  
However, this test launch lays bare the risks that come with any new system or 
spacecraft being tested. Some of the errors could not be caught in simulation or 
testing on ground, and only manifested during the actual flight.  Others could 
have been found through a more substantive and flight-like test program. It is 
important to note, especially given the context of this paper, that the launch 
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vehicle chosen performed perfectly. However, when the payloads are worth 
significantly more than the launch itself, both in monetary value and national 
security mission value, these types of software errors become extremely costly.  
One question, therefore, is how much testing or how many test flights might be 
necessary until a system is deemed secure and safe for actual launches; for the 
NSSL, this is a standard that is not clearly defined since the only reference point 
is ULA’s almost perfect (98.9% success rate as of March 26th, 2020) mission 
track record and history of launches. 
ii. Case Study: Columbia – Equipment Failure and NASA Internal Safety Culture  
On February 1st, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated after re-
entering the atmosphere, leading to the loss of its seven-member crew. 
However, “its fate had been all but sealed during ascent, when a 1.67-pound 
piece of insulating foam broke away from the external fuel tank and struck the 
leading edge of the craft’s left wing. The foam punched a hole that would later 
allow superheated gases to cut through the wing’s interior like a blowtorch.”91  
The Columbia launched on January 16th, 2003. According to the Report of 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, “post-launch photographic analysis 
showed that one large piece and at least two smaller pieces of insulating foam 
separated from the external tank left-bipod (-Y) ramp area at 81.7 seconds after 
launch. Later analysis showed that the larger piece struck Columbia on the 
underside of the left wing.”92 The Intercenter Photo Working Group had 
discovered the debris strike after the launch film was processed overnight, and 
requested that “a high-resolution image of the Orbiter on-orbit be obtained by 
the Department of Defense,” the first of three distinct requests to image the 
Columbia.93 On January 21st, five days into the mission, the Debris Assessment 
Team held its first meeting, which ended with the highest-ranking NASA 
engineering bringing forth the team’s request for imaging the wing on-orbit to 
the Johnson Space Center Engineering Management Directorate. However, the 
Space Shuttle Program managers declined to image Columbia, which meant the 
Debris Assessment Team would have to use mathematical modeling to assess 
damage, even though the modeling tool would not be adequate for modeling this 
specific type of impact. The team determined that there would be some amount 
of damage but could not definitively state what would happen. On January 24th, 
the Mission Management Team “declared the debris strike a ‘turnaround’ issue 
and did not pursue the request for imagery, thus limiting the investigation.94 
Ultimately, when Columbia descended on February 1st, it spun out of control 
and disintegrated.  
The Columbia disaster highlights critical issues in both the technology and what 
has been referred to as NASA’s “broken safety culture.”95 Debris-shedding of 
the foam was not a problem unique to the last Columbia mission. At one point 
the foam shedding was characterized as an “accepted risk,” rather than a “not a 
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safety-of-flight” issue. However, the two terms became blurred over time, and 
with each successful landing, NASA engineers and managers “increasingly 
regarded the foam-shedding as inevitable, and as either unlikely to jeopardize 
safety or simply an acceptable risk”, a simple maintenance or “turnaround” 
issue.96 As further noted by the Board, “assessments of foam-shedding and 
strikes were not thoroughly substantiated by engineering analysis, and the 
process for closing In-Flight Anomalies is not well-documented and appears to 
vary.” Another issue of question was NASA’s lack of understanding of foam 
properties, and “although tests were conducted to develop and qualify foam for 
use on the External Tank, it appears there were large gaps in NASA’s 
knowledge about this complex and variable material.”97 All of these factors 
contributed to the oversight and denial of a significant technical weakness.  
STS-27R Atlantis and STS-107 Columbia also showed a significant difference 
in how the two debris strike events were treated. As outlined Chapter 6 of the 
report:   
“After the discovery of the debris strike on Flight Day Two of STS-27R, the 
crew was immediately directed to inspect the vehicle. More severe thermal 
damage – perhaps even a burn-through – may have occurred were it not for the 
aluminum plate at the site of the tile loss. Fourteen years later, when a debris 
strike was discovered on Flight Day Two of STS-107, Shuttle Program 
management declined to have the crew inspect the Orbiter for damage, declined 
to request on-orbit imaging, and ultimately discounted the possibility of a burn-
through. In retrospect, the debris strike on STS-27R is a ‘strong signal’ of the 
threat debris posed that should have been considered by Shuttle management 
when STS-107 suffered a similar debris strike. The Board views the failure to 
do so as an illustration of the lack of institutional memory in the Space Shuttle 
Program that supports the Board’s claim, discussed in Chapter 7, that NASA is 
not functioning as a learning organization.”98 
As further highlighted in Chapter 7, there are several central considerations that 
critical for understanding NASA’s failures as an agency:  
o Commitment to a Safety Culture  
o Ability to Operate in Both a Centralized and Decentralized Manner 
o Importance of Communication  
o Avoiding Oversimplification  
o Conditioned by Success  
o Significance of Redundancy  
The CAIB report goes into significant detail about how the NASA failed to 
accomplish these objectives, which ultimately contributed to an internal safety 
culture that was complacent and placed priority focus on the wrong issues. The 
Board noted how “cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to 
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safety were allowed to develop,” with “reliance on past success as a substitute 
for sound engineering practices” and “organizational barriers that prevented 
effective communication of critical safety information.”99 Again, in the context 
of this paper, the USSF is the agency in charge of maintaining the NSSL, which 
means NASA’s organizational culture and weakness, especially for that time 
frame, will not directly impact the NSSL. Even so, the gaps and vulnerabilities 
that NASA experienced should be noted so that the institutional memory can be 
used to better inform future decisions. 
b. Reusable Launch Vehicles  
In contrast to expendable launch systems or launch vehicles, which are used only 
once to carry a payload into space, reusable launch systems are intended to “allow 
for recovery of all or part of the system for later reuse. To date, several fully 
reusable sub-orbital systems and partially reusable orbital systems have been 
flown. However, the design issues are extremely challenging and no fully 
reusable orbital launch system has yet been demonstrated.”100 Despite the 
difficulties, companies such as SpaceX are still looking into developing reusable 
launch systems as a way to reduce the cost of space access and to better retain 
resources. Theoretically, “a reusable rocket could launch payloads much less 
expensively than existing expendable rockets, allowing the company to gain more 
market share and, perhaps, opening new markets.”101 Even so, there isn’t a huge 
rush to develop a fully reusable launch vehicle, other than SpaceX’s efforts,102 
due to some perceptions that the launch market will remain relatively consistent in 
its demands.103 Market demands may change as technology advances, but 
different launch providers have taken different stances on the proposed launch 
vehicles for the NSSL Phase 2.  
i. Blue Origin  
According to Blue Origin, “New Glenn’s full reusable first stage (powered by 
BE-4 rockets) is designed for a minimum of 25 flights.”104 After lifting off from 
Launch Complex 36 at Cape Canaveral and following stage separation, the 
“first stage flies back to Earth and lands nearly 1,000 km downrange on a 
moving ship, allowing the booster to land in heavy sea-states.”105  
Though it won’t be used in the New Glenn, Blue Origin’s BE-3PM engine has 
demonstrated reusability and has completed 11 successful flights with the New 
Shepard. According to a Blue Origin fact sheet, the “BE-3PM is designed for 
operational reusability with minimal maintenance between flights and uses high 
performing liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.106 At full throttle, BE-3PM 
generates 490 kN (110,000 lbf) thrust at sea level. When returning to Earth, it 
uniquely throttles down to 90 kN (20,000 lbf), enabling a controlled and gentle 
vertical landing on the pad.” Although the BE-3PM operates with liquid oxygen 
and liquid hydrogen, compared to the BE-4 liquefied natural gas (LNG) rocket 
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engine, Blue Origin has demonstrated the ability to deliver on some form of 
reusable engine. 
ii. SpaceX  
In the Falcon 9’s User Guide, reusability is highlighted as an integral element of 
the Falcon program; in 2018, SpaceX flew more missions with a flight-proven 
rocket than a first flight rocket. Falcon 9’s Block 5 first stage boosters are 
“designed to fly 10 times with little refurbishment in between flights, and 100 
times before the vehicle would be retired.”107 In the long run, SpaceX wants to 
make a fully reusable rocket, and is now pursuing attempts to “recover and 
reuse the payload fairings, the protective nose cone that shields the rocket’s 
cargo as it travels through the atmosphere.”108 In March 2020, SpaceX launched 
the Starlink 5 mission, which marked the second time SpaceX has flown a full 
payload fairing. As such, the rocket’s upper stage is now the remaining piece of 
hardware that is new for each launch. 
iii. Northrop Grumman  
OmegA is a fully expendable launch vehicle that was designed specifically to 
launch national security missions.109 
iv. ULA  
ULA chose to start the Vulcan Centaur as an expendable vehicle, though the 
ULA plans to later reuse Vulcan’s first-stage engines; according to Tiphaine 
Louradour, ULA’s president of global commercial sales, “ULA still believes 
reusability makes sense when saving the engine instead of the entire first-stage 
booster, as SpaceX does.”110 Currently, there is still no timeline as to when the 
Vulcan will be made reusable. 
ii. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities  
 
a. Cybersecurity  
The GAO defines cybersecurity as “the defense against attacks on our information 
technology infrastructure.”111 The weaknesses with IT systems that support 
federal agencies and critical infrastructure is the complex, dynamic, technological 
diverse and geographically dispersed nature of these systems, which make it 
difficult to identify manage, and protect the numerous operating systems, 
applications, and devices that make up the IT systems.112 The issue becomes even 
more complicated when factoring in the networks that connect internal and 
external systems, including the Internet. In FY2017 there were 35,277 total 
federal information security incidents, with different threat vector categories of 
multiple attack vectors, attrition, external/removable media, physical cause, web, 
loss or theft of equipment, email/phishing, improper usage, or other attack 
methods.113 Breaches and attacks can result in loss of personal identifiable 
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information (PII), money or resources, data theft, or damage to critical 
infrastructure. 
b. Supply Chain Security  
The GAO did a study on information security risks that are associated with the 
supply chains used by the federal government. As stated, “IT systems are essential 
to the operations of the federal government. The supply chain – the set of 
organizations, people, activities, and resources that create and move a product 
from suppliers to end users – for IT systems is complex and global in scope.”114 It 
makes for a rich target, since there are many points at which the supply chain can 
be compromised; on the cybersecurity end, experts have even described supply 
chain attacks as “worst-case scenarios, because they taint products or services at 
the time of their creation.”115 
i. Hardware Supply Chain Attack 
Hardware supply chain attacks are primarily about gaining access to the system 
and allowing control without leaving behind traces. In a Bloomberg report on 
Supermicro and other major manufacturers that were compromised, officials 
discuss how hardware implants on a motherboard could allow them to a.) tell 
the infected device to communicate with other anonymous computers and 
networks and to b.) prepare the infected device’s operating system to accept 
new code, which would allow perpetrators to gain open access to the infected 
devices.116 Since the USG (U.S. Government) does not manufacture its own 
computers or processing systems in-house and buys them as do other 
companies, such hardware attacks can have severe implications for the security 
of classified systems. Even very small manipulations of hardware can create 
devasting gaps and vulnerabilities, with the added difficulty of being hard to 
detect. 
ii. Software Supply Chain Attack  
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) defines a software supply 
chain attack as “compromising software code through cyberattacks, insider 
threats, and other close access activities at any phase of the supply chain to 
infect an unsuspecting the customer.”117 They can be simple or complicated in 
nature and attack in many different ways. Due to the relative efficiency and low 
cost of these types of attacks, software supply chain attacks can bypass 
traditional cybersecurity defense and compromise a large number of computers 
and networks. The shift towards software as a means of infiltrating the supply 
chain may also be “due to improved security for consumers and companies 
cutting off some other easy route to infection,” with the general public 
becoming more aware about general security measures.118 Software supply 
chain vulnerability can affect any and all systems in any sector, so this should 
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be considered a definitive vulnerability for the NSSL program and launch 
providers. 
c. Insider Threat  
The National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) defines an insider threat as a 
“threat posed to U.S. national security by someone who misuses or betrays, 
wittingly or unwittingly, their authorized access to any U.S. Government 
resource. This threat can include damage through espionage, terrorism, 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or 
degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.”119 Insider threats don’t 
always involve malicious intent, as people might not be aware of the implications 
of their action or might be exploited by adversaries. Regardless of intent, insider 
threat does affect the security of whatever system and information is being 
handled because the human link is often considered the weakest in any security 
system.120 Additionally, insider threats can cause damage in many different ways, 
such as economic espionage12 or compromising information and personnel. These 
actions are punishable by law.13 
i. Case Study: Boeing Engineer Espionage Case  
In July 2009, a former Rockwell and Boeing engineer, Dongfan “Greg” Chung, 
from Orange County, CA was convicted of “charges of economic espionage and 
acting as an agent of the People’s Republic of China, for whom he stole 
restricted technology and Boeing trade secrets, including information related to 
the Space Shuttle program and Delta IV rocket.”121 According to the evidence 
presented, “individuals in the Chinese aviation industry began sending Chung 
‘tasking’ letters as early as 1979. Over the years, the letters directed Chung to 
collect specific technological information, including data related to the Space 
Shuttle and various military and civilian aircraft.”122 FBI and NASA agents 
“found more than 250,000 pages of documents from Boeing, Rockwell and 
other defense contractors inside the house and in a crawl space…scores of 
binders containing decades’ worth of stress analysis reports, test results and 
design information for the Space Shuttle.”123 It is not clear whether the 
information leaks on the Delta IV had any impact on the NSSL program 
directly, but ULA is currently launching NSSL missions and competing with the 
 
12 The FBI defines economic espionage as foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity 
directed at the U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons, designed to unlawfully or 
clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions or to unlawfully obtain sensitive financial, trade, 
or economic policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical technologies. This theft, 
through open and clandestine methods, can provide foreign entities with vital proprietary economic 
information at a fraction of the true cost of its research and development, causing significant economic losses. 
See "What is 'economic," FBI. 
13 See Economic Espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013). Accessed April 2020. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1831; and Disclosure of Classified Information, 18 U.S.C. § 798 
(1996). Accessed April 2020. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/798.  
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new Vulcan Centaur. Due to the nature of national security programs, the NSSL 
has many classified and restricted components that can be damaging or 
dangerous if leaked or lost. As such, this case study does point to vulnerabilities 
with program personnel, whether contractor or USG employee, and how a 
similar situation could occur with any launch provider or contractor. 
iii. Defense Acquisition Weakness  
 
a. Different Contract Types, Funding, and Agreements  
 
i. EELV Original Contract Model vs. NSSL Current Acquisition Strategy  
According to the GAO, the ULA was the primary provider of launch vehicles to 
the EELV from 2006 to 2013,124 operating under a two-contract structure that 
unfortunately for Congress did not provide much insight into launch costs. The 
two-contract structure enabled the DoD to meet its needs for “unprecedented 
mission success and an at-the-ready launch capability” but “the scope of its 
cost-reimbursement contract limited the DoD’s ability to identify the cost of an 
individual launch as direct launch costs were not separated from other costs.” 
The two-contract structure operated as follows: 
1. ELS firm-fixed-price contract to pay for hardware and;  
2. ELC cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to fund infrastructure and 
engineering support 
DoD officials have said the ELC contract was not transparent and there was a 
limited understanding of activities funded under this contract.125 The DoD also 
had a minimal understanding of contractor cost and lack of pricing data, 
possibly impacting their ability to negotiate reasonable launch prices. As such, 
GAO concluded that “coupled with uncertainties and possible instability in the 
launch vehicle industrial base, EELV program costs were predicted to rise at an 
unsustainable rate.”126 
At the time of the GAO report in 2014, the DoD was looking to develop a 
methodology for proposal evaluation and new proposal structures. If the DoD 
maintained a similar two-contract structure as it did with the ULA monopoly, 
“there could be benefits to DoD and ULA, but potential burdens to new 
entrants. Alternatively, if DoD implements a fixed-price commercial approach 
to launch proposals, DoD could lose insight into contractor cost or pricing. DoD 
could also require a combination of elements from each of these approaches or 
develop new contract requirements for this competition.”127 
The original contract model also drew concerns from members of Congress in 
terms of “how much the U.S. Air Force pays for the [RD-180 rocket] engines, 
how much the Russians receive, and whether members of the elite in President 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia are secretly profiting by inflating the price.”128 
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However, the proposed ban of the Russian RD-180s in 2015 raised the question 
of whether SpaceX could recreate a monopoly over national security launches in 
the same way ULA did, since there would be no one else available to compete 
against SpaceX if ULA could not fly its Atlas V or Delta IV rockets.129 Today, 
with so many different commercial launch providers and launch system 
capabilities, this isn’t as critical a concern, with a variety of companies such as 
Blue Origin, FireFly, Rocket Lab, and others available to compete. The focus 
could be instead placed on national security certifications, such as the process 
that certified SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy for NSSL launches. 
The NSSL is currently in Phase 2 of adjusting its acquisition strategy and is 
transitioning away from the original EELV contract model. Phase 1 and Phase 
1A consisted of the initial sole-source block-buy awarded to ULA, with cores 
later awarded to SpaceX after modifications were made, but Phase 2 seeks full 
competition among all launch service providers. As noted earlier, the 
operational requirements, budget, and potential for competition are currently 
being worked on. Though the objective is to gain more transparency into the 
contract costs and to provide more competition among providers, it is still too 
early to tell if the changes in Phase 2 will deliver on its promises of reducing 
costs while maintaining assured access to space. 
ii. Challenges with USAF Phase 2 Procurement Efforts  
Progression towards Phase 2 of the acquisition strategy has not been without 
issue; launch providers and USG have had disagreements over how the 
acquisition process is happening, which indicates gaps in the strategy. 
1. SpaceX Lawsuit  
In May 2019, SpaceX filed a lawsuit against U.S. government to 
challenge the USAF’s October 2018 Launch Service Agreements (LSAs), 
which were awarded to Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation 
Systems, and ULA.130 The LSAs were intended to “facilitate the 
development of three domestic launch system prototypes and enable the 
future competitive selection of two national security space launch service 
providers for future procurements.”131 Since SpaceX did not receive one, 
it would have to field the costs of research and development on its own. 
According to the bid protest filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 
SpaceX “does not seek any advantage, but only the opportunity to 
compete for national security missions on a fair and level playing field” 
and is only challenging the LSAs awarded, not the NSSL Phase 2 RFP.132 
In response, Blue Origin, NGIS, and ULA have all filed motions to 
intervene in the lawsuit, which allows the Department of Justice to use 




In January 2019, SpaceX has requested the U.S. District Court of the 
Central District of California to hold a hearing on March 2nd, 2020.134 
SpaceX is arguing that not having LSA funds “has caused the company 
financial damage…and also ‘irreparable harm’ because not being an LSA 
recipient means SpaceX does not get direct insight into the Air Force’s 
design priorities and technical requirements for the Phase 2 
competition.”135 Additionally, SpaceX will be making the same case that 
“while we support the Air Force moving forward with its Phase 2 
acquisition strategy for national security space launches as currently 
planned, we are formally challenge the Air Force’s LSA decision to 
ensure a level playing field for competition.”136 It is uncertain how the 
case will turn out.  
This lawsuit points towards a gap in the USAF’s goal of achieving open 
competition between launch providers, and how there are discrepancies 
between what the USG and launch providers perceive of contract and 
funding opportunities. 
2. Blue Origin Pre-award Protest  
On August 12, 2019 Blue Origin filed a pre-award protest with the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) over the structure of the 
USAF’s Phase 2 Launch Service Provider (LSP) competition.137 Blue 
Origin raised multiple challenges to the Phase 2 Request for Proposal 
(RFP) issued on May 3rd, 2019, which is an unrestricted competition.138 
The protests are as follows:  
a.) Protest challenging the solicitation’s basis for award that will 
use a methodology predicated on the agency’s determination of 
which combination of two independently developed proposals 
offers the best value to the government.14  
b.) Protest alleging that the agency’s acquisition strategy will 
unduly restrict competition and result in de-facto sole-source 
acquisition procedures.15 
c.) Protest challenging the solicitation’s price evaluation 
methodology as ambiguous.16 
 
14 Sustained, where the methodology does not provide an intelligible, common basis on which offerors will be 
expected to compete and have their proposals evaluated.  
15 Denied, where the record shows that the terms of the solicitation are reasonably necessary to meet the 
agency’s needs, and the protestor’s policy objections fail to state cognizable bases of protest within [GAO]’s 
bid protest jurisdiction.  
16 Denied, where the record shows that the terms of the solicitation provide sufficient information to allow 
offerors to intelligently prepare their proposals on a common basis.  
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d.) Protest challenging provisions in a commercial item solicitation 
as contrary to customary commercial practice.17  
The GAO sustained in part, and denied in part, Blue Origin’s protest. 
They found that “the RFP’s anticipated ‘when combined’ best-value 
methodology fails to provide offerors with an intelligible and common 
basis for competition” and sustained the first protest. The 
recommendation is as follows: We recommend that the Air Force amend 
the solicitation consistent with our decision and the requirements of 
applicable procurement law and regulation.139 The GAO then dismissed 
the rest of the protests.  
At the time of the decision, the recommended change was “unlikely to 
seriously delay Air Force plans to contract next-generation launch 
services by June 2020, according to the Air Force.”140 However, a 
spokesperson for ULA voiced a slight concern regarding the potential for 
delay, as “we believe the timetable the Air Force has set for this 
procurement is critical to ensuring on-time launch of important 
missions,” since it may take some time to rewrite the RFP.141 In 
December 2019, the amendment to the NSSL Phase 2 LSP RFP was in 
final coordination, according to SMC Launch Enterprise Director Col. 
Robert Bongiovi.142 Bongiovi also “insisted that the change in the 
evaluation criteria will not affect the overall program schedule,” as the 
USAF plans to select two launch providers in the third quarter of 
FY20.143 Updates were made on December 20th, 2019 to the official 
USG contract website and contract solicitation (Notice ID FA8811-19-R-
0002),144 which set the official offer due dates to February 5th, 2020. As 
such, Phase 2 procurement efforts appear to still be on track for selection 
later this year.  
While the protest and amendment process have not dramatically affected 
the USAF’s procurement timeline, having potential conflicts over 
acquisition processes can affect and create delays in scheduling. It also 
illustrates a potential gap in the United States Government’s (USG) 
understanding of terminology or criteria that commercial providers are 
more accustomed to, or commercial practice versus government contract 
practices. If the USG wants to continue increasing private sector 
involvement, it may be worth exploring best practices that work well for 
both parties. 
iii. Delays in Testing and Program Scheduling  
 
 
17 Denied, where the protestor does not show that the provisions are inconsistent with customary 
commercial practice.  
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1. Launch Delays  
Between 2002 and 2006, the NSSL program (then EELV) experienced 
significant delays when “the anticipated commercial launch market did 
not materialize in the early 2000s,” with “the last of these originally 
awarded missions launched in 2016.”145 Similar issues with anticipating 
the future space environment and launch market is something to keep in 
mind when adjusting the acquisition structure to accommodate 
commercial launch providers.  
Sudden changes to launch manifests can cause significant delays, whether 
due to “mishaps, payload delays, sudden space threats, supply chain 
disruption, or natural disasters.”146 Thus, a potential gap to address would 
be the possibility of multi-manifest launches and flexible launch 
programming, and whether there are ways to provide more adaptable 
systems that can accommodate launch schedule changes more efficiently.  
Within recent years, the ULA has delayed launches in order to avoid 
suffering launch failure and to maintain their mission success rates for the 
Atlas V and Delta IV. Though ULA claims “to be the most on-time 
launch provider in the United States,” other analysis of past few launches 
“shows a 42% scrub delay rate” and a willingness to delay “almost half 
their Atlas V launches in a two-year window.”147 Though mission success 
is crucial, it is also important to consider possible impacts of delayed 
launches and scheduling, especially when timing is just as critical for 
ensuring national security space access and capabilities. 
2. COVID-19 and Impacts on Operations  
As of March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) has 
categorized the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) as a pandemic. 
According to the USAF COVID-19 Fact Sheet, the “Department of the 
Air Force is responding appropriately to protect the health of the force 
and maintain operational readiness.”148 As part of the DoD, the USAF 
also follows the health protection conditions (HPCONs) protocol for 
public health emergencies.149 On March 25th, the Secretary of Defense 
“issued guidance to raise the HPCON level to Charlie at all DoD 
installations globally,” which means there will likely be implementation 
of measures such as “maximum telework, cancellation of large-scale 
meetings, taking temperatures at certain access points within buildings,” 
etc.150 The specifics of these measures will vary depending on the 
installation. On April 1st, 2020, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David L. 
Goldfein said that the Air Force is assessing and adjusting practices in 
response to COVID-19 while also ensuring operations continue. Though 
there will likely be negative effects on readiness due to adjusted 
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operations, Goldfein has also “been in contact with major defense 
contractors and to date the virus has not had a heavy impact on the supply 
chain or the Air Force’s ability to get necessary material, parts and 
munitions.”151 As of 9 p.m., April 13th, 2020,18 there are a total of 659 
positive COVID-19 cases and one death in the USAF, including military, 
civilian, dependent, and contractor personnel.152 
Additionally, as of March 29th, the SMC is still reviewing bids from 
launch providers for NSSL Phase 2, which are still targeted to be 
awarded mid-2020. Lt. Gen. John Thompson, commander of the SMS, 
has mentioned that the transition to telework has not delayed source 
selection work, and that none of the launch providers have indicated an 
inability to continue with the procurement process.153 
In the future months, it is highly likely that some programs, including the 
NSSL, might be affected or delayed by a variety of issues brought on by 
COVID-19. On the USG end alone, installations and agencies must adjust 
operations to adapt to the decreased number of in-person employees, 
cancelled meetings, and surge in telework. Depending on classification 
levels and security needs, certain projects might not be able to transition 
to telework or at-home work. According to a senior acquisition executive 
for the USAF, “space and nuclear weapons programs have significant 
classified components which means that discussions on these projects 
have to be conducted in buildings like the Pentagon where there are 
sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs).”154 If employees 
are asked to shelter in place, then there is no way for them to work in the 
SCIFs.  
Another key component to consider are the launch teams, who are also 
taking extra precautions. According to Brig. Gen. Doug Schiess, “several 
hundred people are needed to support a launch, and some missions, like 
AEHF-6, require more range support than others.”155 The SpaceX Falcon 
9 rocket requires around 200 people, while the Atlas V or Delta IV need 
over 300 people to support launches, numbers that include operators, 
weather personnel, safety personnel, and others.156 Though Schiess said 
that he believes “we have to have a significant population within the 
operations folks to be sick to have a situation where it would impact our 
launches,” the COVID-19 pandemic is new and its trajectory and impacts 
are still largely unknown. 
As such, it will be critical to plan for and expect potential delays as 
COVID-19 impacts continue to mount, despite USSF assurance that the 
 
18 These numbers are updated periodically on the Air Force’s COVID-19 page in addition to other updates 
about USAF operations. The Department of Defense has an overall DoD response timeline page that is 
updated daily as well. See Department of Defense, "Coronavirus: DoD Response," U.S. Department of Defense. 
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launch schedule and procurement efforts for the NSSL program will 
proceed with minimal issue.157 
Summary of Potential Gaps and Vulnerabilities  
Technological challenges will remain even as innovation continues to produce newer and better 
products, so it is critical to have a proper framework for addressing those challenges rather than 
to focus on specific technological weaknesses. Another key issue to address is security as it 
relates to supply chains, cybersecurity, and operations. Defense acquisition overall has many 
weaknesses, which might not immediately impact the NSSL, but does pose a long-term issue.158   
 
NSSL Program Adjustments 
Given that the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles are being phased out, and that new launch 
systems are being solicited for the NSSL, the priority of the NSSL should be to maintain 
program security in order to best ensure that critical government payloads will be placed 
successfully with the same, if not higher, launch success rate as was provided by the Atlas and 
Delta launch vehicles. Security protocol should be applied to physical and supply chain security, 
communications and operational security, information security, and insider threats. Secondary 
priorities for the program should focus on decreasing complexity and bureaucratic inefficiencies 
in the defense acquisition process so that the government can access the best technology suited to 
its needs.   
The NSSL Phase 2 LSP Performance Work Statement (PWS) (FA8811-19-R-0002), amended 
most recently as of December 20th, 2019, should be referenced to assess existing requirements 
and program measures and areas of possible adjustment. As defined by the FY19 Federal 
Acquisition Regulation159 (FAR): 
(a) A Performance work statement (PWS) may be prepared by the Government or result 
from a Statement of objectives (SOO) prepared by the Government where the offeror 
proposes the PWS.  
(b) Agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable –  
(1) Describe the work in terms of the required results rather than either “how” the 
work is to be accomplished or the number of hours to be provided;  
(2) Enable assessment of work performance against measurable performance 
standards;  
(3) Rely on the use of measurable performance standards and financial incentives 
in a competitive environment to encourage competitors to develop and institute 
innovative and cost-effective methods of performing the work.  
The NSSL Phase 2 LSP PWS specifically “defines the launch services (LS), mission integration 
(MI), mission-unique (MU), and level of effort (LOE) work the Contractor will perform for 
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National Security Space (NSS) missions. This PWS also defines Launch Service Support (LSS) 
work that will be performed annually, and fleet surveillance (FS) work that the Contractor will 
perform for each non-NSS mission. The PWS includes the Program Management, Systems 
Engineering, Launch Vehicle (LV) Production, Mission Integration, Mission Operations, and 
Support to Government Space Flight Worthiness (SFW), LOE Activities, and Mission-Unique 
Options necessary to deliver healthy Payloads (PL) into their intended orbits managed by Air 
Force Space Command, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFSPC/SMC).”160  
i. Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) 
Ensuring the security of supply chains and lowering possible risks will better enable 
launch vehicle providers to meet the goals stated in the Performance Work Statement.  
a. DNI National Counterintelligence and Security Center  
The DNI National Counterintelligence and Security Center works to assess and 
mitigate the activities of foreign intelligence entities and other adversaries who 
attempt to compromise the supply chains of our government and industry.161 
There are several reports, briefings, and readings that provide information and 
awareness regarding supply chain risk management. 
b. National Institute of Standards and Technology  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) put out a publication 
in 2015 on “Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations,” which seeks to “provide guidance to federal 
agencies on identifying, assessing, and mitigating ICT supply chain risks at all 
levels of their organizations.”162 In detail, the report provides frameworks for 
multitiered organization-wide risk management and applications. As such, it 
provides an in-depth coverage that may be of assistance when looking at launch 
supply security measures and government contracting. 
c. SECURE Technology Act – H.R. 7327163  
The SECURE Technology Act “requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
establish a security vulnerability disclosure policy, to establish a bug bounty 
program for the Department of Homeland Security, to amend title 41, United 
States Code, to provide for Federal acquisition supply chain security, and for 
other purposes.”164  
Title II of the SECURE Technology Act, the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain 
Security Act of 2018, creates the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC); 
the FASC will develop criteria to assist departments and agencies in “determining 
the risk to the ICT supply chain, disseminating supply chain risk information, and 
deciding what action to take to mitigate the risk.”165 Each department and agency, 
which includes the USSF, will be required to have a SCRM program that meets 
these criteria. The goal of the FASC legislation is “to arm departments and 
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agencies with the knowledge to assess their own supply chain risk, make more 
informed decisions to acquire and protect critical ICT components necessary for 
mission success.”166 Such practices can also be applied to contractor practices, 
including launch providers for the NSSL. 
d. 13 Elements of an Effective SCRM Program  
The NCSC 13 Elements of an Effective SCRM Program167 provides a simplified 
and concise outline of objectives to pursue when setting up a SCRM. The thirteen 
elements are listed:  
1. Obtain executive-level commitment to establish a SCRM program.  
2. Communicate with all organizational stakeholders – horizontally and 
vertically.  
3. Identify, assess, and prioritize critical assets, systems, processes, and 
suppliers.  
4. Implement integrated risk reduction: identify, assess, prioritize, and 
implement measures to reduce risks to items delineated in no.3 above.  
5. Elevate security as a primary metric, just like cost, schedule, and 
performance, for assessing a vendor’s ability to meet contract 
requirements.  
6. Conduct due diligence on suppliers at least through the first tier.  
7. Monitor suppliers’ adherence to agreed-upon SCRM-related security 
requirements.  
8. Identify critical data and information about organization and customers.  
9. Establish processes to share information with suppliers about 
vulnerabilities and vice versa.  
10. Manage security risks when terminating relationships with suppliers.  
11. Monitor effectiveness of established risk mitigating strategies; update as 
needed.  
12. Train employees about managing, mitigating, and responding to supply 
chain risks.  
13. Plan for contingency operations; exercise plans regularly, update as 
needed.  
In conjunction with NIST publications and other NCSC materials, this framework 
is recommended as a course of action to take to better protect the NSSL program 
when it comes to launch provider supply chains. Additionally, this helps provide a 
general framework that can be used to guide the finer details in the Performance 
Work Statement to ensure all elements are covered.  
Something of interest to consider is the use of performance-based functional availability 
(PFA) tools, which can be used to evaluate satellite failure risk. PFA models “can address 
risks at the piece-part level, such as suspect microelectronics as a function of reduced 
performance and likelihood of occurrence.”168 By factoring in technical risks and 
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schedule slips and adjusting for launch schedules and reliability or performance models, 
the PFA tools can be used to compute constellation impact, user impact, enterprise 
impact, and resilience impact. As such, “once a PFA tool is established for a 
constellation, regenerating impact plots is quickly accomplished for any given technical 
risk or schedule slips allowing for direct comparisons at multiple impact levels.”169 Such 
tools can provide a way to deduce proper responses and decisions in the event of a 
compromised supply chain or other possible security concern, allowing for adjustments to 
be made for not just a single mission but also constellations and operations as a whole.  
ii. Cybersecurity  
Based on the GAO’s High-Risk Series Study on cybersecurity challenges, there are ten 
critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address the 
four major cybersecurity challenges.170 The recommendations are listed based on which 
challenge they address:  
1. Challenge: Establishing a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and performing 
effective oversight.  
a. Develop and execute a more comprehensive federal strategy for national 
cybersecurity and global cyberspace.  
b. Mitigate global supply chain risks (e.g., installation of malicious software 
or hardware).  
c. Address cybersecurity workforce management challenges.  
d. Ensure the security of emerging technologies (e.g., artificial intelligence 
and the Internet of Things).  
2. Challenge: Securing federal systems and information  
a. Improve implementation of government-wide cybersecurity initiatives.  
b. Address weaknesses in federal agency information security programs.  
c. Enhance the federal response to cyber incidents.  
3. Challenge: Protecting cyber critical infrastructure.  
a. Strengthen the federal role in protecting the cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructure (e.g., electricity grid and telecommunications network).  
4. Challenge: Protecting privacy and sensitive data.  
a. Improve federal efforts to protect privacy and sensitive data.  
b. Appropriately limit the collection and use of personal information and 
ensure that it is obtained with appropriate knowledge or consent.  
Based on one of GAO’s cybersecurity framework from 2004,171 the NSSL should also 
incorporate these five points in tandem with the more recent 2018 framework:  
1. Determine the business requirements for security;  
2. Perform risk assessments;  
3. Establish a security policy;  
4. Implement a cybersecurity solution that includes people, processes, and 
technologies to mitigate identified security risks; and  
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5. Continuously monitor and manage security.  
Because cybersecurity is so critical to ensuring the functions of the nation’s 
infrastructure, adopting stronger protections and reducing risks will help better minimize 
security vulnerabilities across all areas of government functions. The NSSL would 
benefit significantly from heightened cybersecurity measures, since it carries out critical 
and often classified national security space missions. With more complex launch systems 
and increased automation, there will be both current and new vulnerabilities that need to 
be addressed. Cybersecurity will also be important for contractors and launch providers, 
especially since there is a lot of sensitive information that is being transferred daily, as 
well as personnel and teams that work on these missions and operations.  
iii. Models for Safety Programs  
The following programs have been highlighted as successful independent safety 
programs that have strived for and achieved accident-free performance.172 As noted, “the 
safety cultures and organizational structure of all three make them highly adept in dealing 
with inordinately high risk by designing hardware and management systems that prevent 
seemingly inconsequential failures from leading to major accidents. Although size, 
complexity, and missions in these organizations and NASA differ (in the context of this 
paper, the NSSL as well), the following comparisons yield valuable lessons for the space 
agency to consider when re-designing its organization to increase safety.”173 Though the 
frameworks were outlined over 17 years ago, similar practices can be adapted and 
incorporated; relevant sections have been taken directly from the report. 
a. U.S. Navy Submarine Flooding Prevention and Recovery (SUBSAFE)  
SUBSAFE serves to verify the readiness and safety of submarines. Practices that 
have factored into the success of the program include:  
i. SUBSAFE requirements are clearly documented and achievable, with 
minimal “tailoring” or granting of waivers. 
ii. A separate compliance verification organization independently assess 
program management.  
iii. The submarine Navy has a strong safety culture that emphasizes 
understanding and learning from past failures.  
iv. The Navy implements extensive safety training based on the Thresher19 
and Scorpion20 accidents. 
v. The SUBSAFE structure is enhanced by the clarity, uniformity, and 
consistency of submarine safety requirements and responsibilities. 
 
19 The USS Thresher (SSN-593) sank after a possible piping failure during deep submergence tests off the New 
England coast and was declared lost at sea on April 10th, 1963. See U.S. Navy, "US Navy," Naval History and 
Heritage Command. 
20 The USS Scorpion (SSN-589) loss was not ascertainable, though potentially due to inadvertent activation of 
battery of torpedo resulting in a possible “hot run” torpedo detonation off Azores. Declared lost May 27th, 
1968. See U.S. Navy, "US Navy," Naval History and Heritage Command. 
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Program managers are not permitted to “tailor” requirements without 
approval from the organization with final authority for technical 
requirements and the organization that verifies SUBSAFE’s compliance 
with critical design and process requirements.  
vi. The SUBSAFE Program and implementing organization are relatively 
immune to budget pressures.  
vii. Compliance with critical SUBSAFE design and process requirements is 
independently verified by a highly capable centralized organization that 
also “owns” the processes and monitors the program for compliance.  
viii. Quantitative safety assessments in the Navy submarine program are 
deterministic rather than probabilistic.  
 
b. Naval Nuclear Propulsion (Naval Reactor) Programs  
The Naval Reactor Program is a joint Navy/Department of Energy organization 
responsible for all aspects of Navy nuclear propulsion, including research, design, 
construction, testing, training, operation, maintenance, and the disposition of the 
nuclear propulsion plants onboard many Naval ships and submarines, as well as 
their radioactive materials.174 
The U.S. nuclear Navy has more than 5,500 reactor- years of experience without a 
reactor accident. Put another way, nuclear-powered warships have steamed a 
cumulative total of over 127 million miles, which is roughly equivalent to over 
265 lunar roundtrips. In contrast, the Space Shuttle Program has spent about three 
years on-orbit, although its spacecraft have traveled some 430 million miles.175 
In 2020 the numbers are significantly different for the varying space programs, 
but the nuclear Navy remains steadfast in its safety. In a DoE/Navy report from 
November 2015, the naval reactors maintained “an outstanding record of over 157 
million miles safely steamed on nuclear power. The Program currently operates 
96 operators and has accumulated over 6,700 reactor- years of operation.176 The 
absence of radiological incidents is testament to the program’s success.  
Key elements of the program can be grouped into several categories: 
Communication and Action:  
Formal and informal practices ensure that relevant personnel at all levels 
are informed of technical decisions and actions that affect their area of 
responsibility. Contractor technical recommendations and government 
actions are documented in peer-reviewed formal written correspondence. 
Unlike NASA, PowerPoint briefings and papers for technical seminars are 
not substitutes for completed staff work. In addition, contractors strive to 
provide recommendations based on a technical need, uninfluenced by 
headquarters or its representatives. Accordingly, division of 
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responsibilities between the contractor and the Government remain clear, 
and a system of checks and balances is therefore inherent. 
  Recurring Training and Learning from Mistakes  
The Naval Reactor Program has yet to experience a reactor accident. This 
success is partially a testament to design, but also due to relentless and 
innovative training, grounded on lessons learned both inside and outside 
the program. For example, since 1996, Naval Reactors has educated more 
than 5,000 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program personnel on the lessons 
learned from the Challenger accident. 
Encouraging Minority Opinions  
The Naval Reactor Program encourages minority opinions and “bad 
news.” Leaders continually emphasize that when no minority opinions are 
present, the responsibility for a thorough and critical examination falls to 
management. Alternate perspectives and critical questions are always 
encouraged. 
Retaining Knowledge 
Naval Reactors uses many mechanisms to ensure knowledge is retained. 
The Director serves a minimum eight-year term, and the program 
documents the history of the rationale for every technical requirement. 
Key personnel in Headquarters routinely rotate into field positions to 
remain unfamiliar with every aspect of operations, training, maintenance, 
development and the workforce. Current and past issues are discussed in 
open forum with the Director and immediate staff at “all-hands” 
informational meetings under an in-house professional development 
program.  
Worst-Case Event Failures  
Naval Reactors hazard analyses evaluate potential damage to the reactor 
plant, potential impact on people, and potential environmental impact. 
c. Aerospace Corporation’s Launch Verification Process  
“The Aerospace Corporation, created in 1960, operates as a Federal Funded 
Research and Development Center that supports the government in science and 
technology that is critical to national security.”177  
“Aerospace’s primary product is a formal verification letter to the Air Force 
Systems Program Office stating a vehicle has been independently verified as 
ready for launch. The verification includes an independent General Systems 
Engineering and Integration review of launch preparations Aerospace staff, a 
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review of launch system design and payload integration, and a review of the 
adequacy of flight and ground hardware, software, and interfaces.”  
“This ‘concept-to-orbit’ process begins in the design requirements phase, 
continues through the formal verification to countdown and launch, and concludes 
with a post-flight evaluation of events with findings for subsequent missions. 
Aerospace Corporation personnel cover the depth and breadth of space 
disciplines, and the organization has its own integrated engineering analysis, 
laboratory, and test matrix capability.” 
Today, Aerospace continues to offer Launch Assurance as one of their several 
focus areas.178 Most recently, Aerospace used its comprehensive launch 
verification process to assist with ULA’s Atlas V AEHF-6 mission, which was the 
first successful NSSL launch under the new USSF.179 Aerospace also successfully 
accommodated COVID-19 challenges and developed and implemented a highly 
distributed launch support concept of operations.180 Extensive preparation and 
pre-coordination were key to ensuring the mission success.  
As noted earlier, “spacecraft and submarines both operate in hazardous environments, use 
complex and dangerous systems, and perform missions of critical national 
significance.”181 Thus, of all three safety programs that were mentioned in the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board report, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program offers the 
best framework for a potential safety or accountability program for the NSSL. The 
stakeholders are similar, with both government and private sector components. The Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program highlights the importance of communication between all 
parties and the need for knowledge-based decision making, both of which are critical 
components to the NSSL program, especially during the procurement phases. For the 
NSSL specifically, having another component within the agency (here, the USSF) to 
provide oversight and accountability could potentially provide added benefits of better 
mediating launch provider-government relations, while also providing more in-depth 
insight into commercial practices and how to best translate them for government 
contracting. Being able to learn from other agencies and successful contract programs is 
also important and having a program for the NSSL could help better collect and 
communicate institutional knowledge and areas for improvement and innovation. To 
supplement the launch processes for the NSSL, Aerospace Corporation’s launch 
assurance should continue to be applied, especially when evaluating new launch vehicles. 
 
Recommendations 
I. Heighten supply chain security to ensure launch providers can provide assured 
and reliable access to space. 
II. Heighten cybersecurity measures to help minimize security risks with 
information, communications, and operations, when transitioning towards an 
increasingly networked system.  
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III. Consider the use of PFA tools and models to evaluate not only satellite failure 
risk but also NSSL mission risk at multiple levels, with the goal of increasing 
preparedness and flexibility when addressing possible challenges.21 
IV. Implement an accountability and oversight program for the NSSL to provide 
increased communication between all parties involved, standardize safe and 
efficient practices, and increase industry and institutional knowledge for better 
sustaining national security space launches.  
a. For Phase 2 and future Phase 3 launch vehicle procurement, continue 
using additional individual launch verification processes to ensure safety 
and capabilities of new launch systems. 
 
Future Work 
The NSSL is still in the middle of the Phase 2 procurement process, and many changes are likely 
to happen rapidly within the next few years. This paper will only cover events leading up to the 
beginning of April 2020. Depending on how the procurement progresses, new problems may 
surface, and others might become irrelevant. One key issue that will likely have a significant yet 
unknown impact is the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected global activities and will likely 
continue to do so.  
A significant point of interest is the GAO’s 2017 “Adopting Best Practices Can Improve 
Innovation Investments and Management” report, which recommended that the DoD “define a 
science and technology management framework that uses leading commercial practices.”182 
Because the DoD’s ability to innovate is limited by its funding policies and Congressional 
funding in general, which do not offer longer-term project funding, it is difficult for the DoD and 
all agencies within to capitalize on best commercial practices and to harness cutting edge 
technology. This paper did not explore management frameworks or investment portfolios for the 
NSSL, so while Phase 2 is largely underway and cannot be changed significantly, Phase 3 is still 
upcoming in the future. As such, it would be interesting to see what research could be done on 
investment models and portfolios to better bring the NSSL program longevity, flexibility, and 
adaptability when it comes to harnessing commercial launch providers.  
More research on cybersecurity measures will also likely be necessary in the future; as launch 
vehicles and systems become increasingly more networked and automated, there will be an even 
higher demand for protecting those critical infrastructures. Cybersecurity covers a wide range of 
essential aspects, including classified information, missions, operations, proprietary hardware 
and software, etc. Once specific launch vehicles are selected for the NSSL, more directed 
cybersecurity measures could be considered for ensuring the continued success of national 
security space missions.   
 
 




The National Security Space Launch program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle program, has undergone a number of changes in the past few years and will 
continue to witness developments as the NSSL Phase 2 Launch Procurement continues. Out of 
launch providers Blue Origin, SpaceX, Northrop Grumman, and United Launch Alliance, two 
will be selected to carry out the national security space missions starting from 2022. The goal is 
to maintain program security so that the NSSL can continue to deliver critical national security 
payloads to space at the same standards, if not higher, as that of the current NSSL fleet. Policy 
goals outline a general trend towards maintaining assured access to space as well as increasing 
space capabilities. There is also the desire to secure the United States’ space presence at a time 
when more parties are becoming involved in the space sector, especially as orbits become 
increasingly crowded. As such, the recommendations are aimed at addressing key vulnerabilities 
that might weaken the NSSL program’s ability to carry out missions. Prioritizing supply chain 
security and cybersecurity will best ensure the success of transitioning to new launch vehicles, 
though it is also critical to maintain existing safety protocols and mission operations. A 
secondary focus on streamlining defense acquisition seeks to address program flexibility and 
readiness in the long term but is more relevant to the future Phase 3 Procurement efforts. It 
therefore becomes even more critical to leverage institutional memory and knowledge in tandem 
with the industry’s current practices in order to enable the NSSL to best fulfill its goals of 
procuring affordable NSSL services, maintain assured access to space, and ensure mission 
success with domestic launch service providers. Looking forward, defense acquisition as a whole 
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